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Provider Payment Mechanisms: 
Effective Policy Tools for 
Achieving Universal and 
Sustainable Healthcare Coverage
Abualbishr Alshreef
Abstract
Globally, governments are seeking to develop equitable and sustainable health-
care systems for delivering universal healthcare coverage under budget constraints. 
This chapter provides an analysis of fee-for-service, a commonly used payment 
mechanism for reimbursement of healthcare providers, and proposes appropriate 
reform in order to promote cost containment in the context of low- and middle-
income countries (LMICs). The analysis used secondary data derived from the 
literature. The analysis revealed that capitation, case-based, and global budget 
provider payment mechanisms have the potential to control healthcare costs by cre-
ating incentives for providers to reduce the volume of services. Capitation payment 
has the potential to promote provider efficiency, while global budget may reward 
inefficient hospitals if risk adjustors (such as gender and age) are not considered in 
the resource allocation formula. Both capitation payment and global budget have 
lower administrative costs compared to fee-for-service. Development of support-
ing measures is crucial including legal, financial, referral, quality assurance, and 
management information systems.
Keywords: health reforms, funding, health insurance, provider payment,  
expenditure and costs, cost containment, LMICs
1. Introduction
Healthcare provider payment mechanisms can be used as powerful tools for 
promoting the development of health systems towards the achievement of health 
policy objectives by encouraging the effective and efficient use of scarce resources 
[1]. This chapter provides an in-depth review addressing the problem of the 
escalating costs of health services for low- and middle-income countries (LMIC) 
and explores alternative provider payment mechanisms for promoting cost con-
tainment and contributes to universal and sustainable healthcare coverage. This 
introduction section provides background information with more focus on the 
widely used fee-for-service (FFS) provider payment mechanism and its impact on 
healthcare costs.
During the past four decades, the escalation of healthcare costs for LMICs has 
been an issue of concern at both operational and policy levels. Many policy tools 
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have been implemented to control the escalation in cost and/or to absorb its nega-
tive effect in many countries. This included revenue generation through the expan-
sion of health insurance population coverage, strengthening contracting capacity, 
and reimbursement of pharmaceuticals based on essential medicines lists (EMLs). 
However, the cost of health services has remained a big challenge for healthcare 
systems in many LMICs.
As an alternative strategic approach, provider payment mechanisms can create 
incentives for wise and efficient use of resources and create a behavioural environ-
ment for healthcare providers to supply cost-effective health services [1–3]. By 
exploring alternative provider payment mechanisms and assessing their effect in 
controlling healthcare costs, potentially feasible measures based on good quality 
evidence may be proposed. Providing evidence for provider payment reform is 
strategically important to contribute to the decision-making process to tackle the 
increasing costs of health services for LMICs. This will contribute to the ongoing 
reforms towards universal healthcare coverage in many countries.
This chapter analyses the existing provider payment mechanism (widely used 
in LMIC context) and proposes payment system reform in order to promote cost 
containment. A conceptual framework was used to analyse the existing provider 
payment mechanism, explore alternative mechanisms and assess their potential 
in promoting cost containment in LMICs. The chapter identifies lessons learned 
from international experiences on cost containment for health insurance schemes 
(and similar funding structures) and assesses the most appropriate options. The 
feasibility of implementing the proposed cost containment measures in the context 
of LMICs is discussed.
This chapter is structured into five sections starting with this introductory sec-
tion. Then, Section 2 describes the methodology and conceptual framework used 
for the analysis. Section 3 analyses the problem of the escalating costs of health 
services in LMIC context and uses the conceptual framework for the analysis of the 
existing FFS payment. Section 4 then analyses the alternative provider payment 
mechanisms for controlling healthcare cost using the same conceptual framework. 
Finally, Section 5 is a concluding section, summarises the key messages, suggests 
potential measures emerged from the analysis and assesses the feasibility of imple-
menting the proposed reform in LMICs.
This chapter of the book is primarily intended for use by policymakers to 
contribute as evidence in the decision-making process for strategic purchasing 
of health services in LMIC context. The evidence provided would also be useful 
for researchers interested in healthcare financing and for other health insurance 
organisations in LMICs. Furthermore, international development partners inter-
ested in health insurance in LMICs may also be interested in this review, including 
World Bank (WB), International Labour Organisation (ILO) and World Health 
Organisation (WHO).
2. Conceptual framework, data and limitations of the review
Having addressed the background information and the aim of the review in 
the previous section, this section describes the conceptual framework used for the 
analysis, sources of data and the limitations of the review. This chapter of the book 
provides an in-depth review exploring alternative healthcare provider-payment 
mechanisms particularly capitation, case-based and global budget as potential 
policy tools for use in the LMICs. The review is based on secondary data from the 
literature combined with the author’s 8 years of experience in LMIC context.
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2.1 The conceptual framework
The conceptual framework used was adapted from the literature, bearing in 
mind a basic question: “how provider payment mechanisms work to control healthcare 
costs?”. The framework is schematically represented in Figure 1. It was developed to 
articulate the analysis of provider payment mechanisms presented in this chapter.
2.1.1 Description of the conceptual framework
The conceptual framework illustrated in Figure 1 is composed of three columns, 
which are clearly distinguished by different colours and these columns are inter-
linked by arrows to demonstrate conceptual relationships. The yellow column on 
the left side represents four provider payment mechanisms: the FFS currently used 
in many LMICs and the three alternative payment mechanisms explored in this 
review (capitation, case-based and global budget). The yellow arrows are pointing 
to the key output aspects outlined in the middle purple column.
The middle purple column illustrates the processes that affect each payment mecha-
nism and, therefore, impact on the cost of health services [4]. Provider payment mecha-
nisms work by creating incentives that affect the volume of supplied services, use of 
input resources, pharmaceuticals, admission rate, average length of stay and prevention 
of diseases [1, 4]. Administrative cost varies between the different payment mechanisms 
and may contribute significantly to the cost of health services for the insurer or health-
care commissioners [5]. These incentives and administrative costs affect the overall cost 
of health services and the cost varies depending on the payment mechanism.
The thick purple arrow emendating from the middle outputs column is pointing 
to the intended outcome (reduction of the overall health services cost). The small 
box that appears in the lower part illustrates efficiency as a criterion used for the 
analysis of provider payment mechanisms. The use of incentives, cost and effi-
ciency in this study is explicitly defined in the following three subsections.
Figure 1. 
Conceptual framework for the analysis of provider payment mechanisms.
Universal Health Coverage
4
2.1.1.1 Incentives
Incentives are defined in microeconomics as economic signals that can direct 
healthcare providers towards self-interested behaviours [1]. These behaviours can 
lead to beneficial or un-intended effects [6]. For example, one payment mecha-
nism can encourage irrational use of pharmaceuticals as an unintended effect, 
while another mechanism can promote a reduction in the average length of stay in 
hospitals as a beneficial effect.
2.1.1.2 Costs
Costs refer to direct cost related to health services covered and reimbursed by 
health insurance schemes (or other payers) and have two components: (a) direct 
medical cost such as pharmaceuticals, consultations and laboratory tests and (b) 
direct non-medical cost such as administrative costs for processing provider claims 
for reimbursement [7]. These represent the cost from the healthcare system per-
spective, which this review aims to reduce.
2.1.1.3 Efficiency
Efficiency criterion is used to show the relationship between provider payment 
mechanisms and their incentives to promote effective and efficient use of resources 
to produce maximum outputs in health care [1, 4, 8]. By promoting efficiency at 
the supply side through different payment mechanisms, the overall cost of health 
services for healthcare systems may be reduced.
2.1.2 Justification and use of the conceptual framework
This conceptual framework represents the key aspects to be analysed in this 
review, thus keeping the analysis focused. It also helps to articulate the relationships 
between provider payment mechanisms and their relative incentives and adminis-
trative cost, which impacts on the cost of health services.
The framework will be used in Section 3 to discuss the role of the existing FFS 
payment mechanism in increasing the cost of health services for LMICs. While in 
Section 4, the framework will be used to guide the critical analysis of the alterna-
tive provider payment mechanisms (capitation, case-based and global budget) and 
assess their potential in reducing the cost of health services.
2.2 Criteria for assessing the feasibility of proposed measures
This has been adapted from [9, 10], and it includes (i) technical feasibility: this 
will be used in Section 4 to assess the potential of alternative payment mechanisms 
to control cost and (ii) organisational, financial and cultural feasibility: this will be 
used in Section 5 to assess the feasibility of implementing the proposed measures in 
LMIC context.
2.3 Data sources and selection of papers for the review
2.3.1 Data sources
A number of sources of information were used to collect secondary data for this 
review. These sources are grouped into four categories:
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• Electronic databases: web of science, global health and science direct electronic 
databases.
• Internet search engines: University of Leeds’s Library electronic catalogue and 
Google Scholar were the search engines used to find the full text of selected articles.
• International Organisations’ websites: World Bank, WHO and ILO. Research 
articles and working papers focused on the topic were retrieved from websites 
of these organisations.
• Other sources of data: books, grey literature and author experiences.
2.3.2 Inclusion and exclusion criteria
Inclusion criteria include: (i) only articles published in English; (ii) articles on 
health insurance, national health insurance and social health insurance with FFS, 
capitation, case-based and global budget; (iii) articles from LMIC context and (iv) 
articles published after 1990 to consider the dynamics in implementing provider 
payment mechanisms.
Exclusion criteria include: (i) articles focused on health insurance coverage, premi-
ums and benefit packages; (ii) articles discussing other provider payment mechanisms 
such as per diem, line item budget and pay for performance; (iii) articles focused 
mainly on developed countries were excluded due to variation from the LMICs context 
and (iv) articles published before 1990 in order to get the most updated evidence.
2.4 Limitations of the review
The main limitation of this review is the lack of published data from many 
LMICs for the analysis of country-specific existing provider payment system. 
However, the author has relied on grey literature including internal reports, con-
ference presentations, other government documents and personal experience. 
Fortunately, evidence from some LMICs where the widely used FFS payment 
mechanism was implemented is available in the literature and has been utilised for 
analysis of the existing provider payment mechanism in Section 3.
The author is also aware that there are other mechanisms for provider payment 
to tackle the increase in healthcare cost including pay for performance, which may 
be seen as a limitation. However, this review focuses only on the above-mentioned 
three alternative payment mechanisms mainly because of the experience of their 
implementation in LMICs.
In summary, this section described this review as an in-depth study primarily 
based on secondary data. It described the conceptual framework and its use in this 
review for analysis for provider payment mechanisms. It described four sources of 
information used for data collection: electronic databases, search engines, inter-
national organisations’ websites and other sources of information from LMICs. It 
highlighted the inclusion and exclusion criteria applied to select relevant papers 
for the review. The next section analyses existing FFS payment mechanism and its 
contribution to cost escalation in LMIC context.
3. Analysing the existing fee-for-service provider payment mechanism
Having discussed the conceptual framework for the analysis of provider pay-
ment mechanisms and the sources of data used in Section 2, this section analyses 
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the existing FFS payment mechanism and its contribution in increasing the cost 
of health services for LMICs. There is a continuous escalation in the cost of health 
services, partly as a result of the implementation of FFS payment for reimburse-
ment of healthcare providers in many LMICs.
3.1 The existing fee-for-service provider payment mechanism in LMICs
FFS is defined as a method for retrospective payment to reimburse healthcare 
providers for each unit of service provided [11]; for example, the unit of service can 
be a GP consultation or a laboratory test. Evidence suggests that healthcare systems 
in many LMICs rely entirely on FFS to reimburse healthcare providers including at 
primary care, outpatient departments and hospitals.
3.1.1 Fee-for-service incentives to oversupply services and pharmaceuticals
FFS creates strong incentives to provide services with high fee schedules, over-
supply of the quantity of services and irrationally increase utilisation of pharma-
ceuticals; therefore, it leads to cost escalation [6, 12, 13]. Based on the conceptual 
framework, the following two subsections will analyse the incentives created by 
FFS to increase the volume of supplied services and induce irrational utilisation of 
pharmaceuticals as two main contributors for cost escalation in LMICs.
3.1.1.1 Fee-for-service incentives to increase the volume of services
FFS leads to excessive use of services by promoting supplier-induced demand 
phenomenon since insured patients depend on providers’ information on their 
needs for healthcare [5]. This phenomenon is even higher under circumstances of 
third-party payers such as insurance-financed services [7]. This is because both 
providers and patients do not bear the financial risk for the cost of service provided 
[14]. From the author’s experience, this practice can create satisfaction among 
patients who believe that high quantities and/or expensive treatments mean good 
quality of health care.
From the author’s experience, there is a remarkable perception among insured 
patients to overuse healthcare services. This moral hazard is another phenomenon 
associated with increasing demand for free or subsidised service [15]. Such phe-
nomena may continue to increase with the existing FFS reimbursement policy. This 
has added effect to increase utilisation of services and therefore contributes to cost 
escalation.
For instance in the National Health Insurance Fund in Sudan, the diagnostic 
and laboratory services account for 89% of all outpatient visits of which 92% was 
reported as visits for laboratory tests [16]. This implies significant irrationality in 
the use of service induced by FFS payment. This relationship is supported by the 
findings of a systematic review study that was conducted to compare capitation, 
salary and FFS payment mechanisms. The study revealed that FFS payment results 
in more primary care visits, specialist visits and more utilisation of diagnostic and 
curative services compared to capitation and salary payments [12]. Similar find-
ings have been reported in Poland, where the average number of visits for dentists 
contracted under FFS payment was more than double compared to that provided by 
salaried dentists [17].
FFS is known for its potential to increase the number of patient visits to primary 
care, specialised, diagnostic and curative health services [12]. As thus, it contributes 
to the increased volume of provided services to meet the interest of providers lead-
ing to cost escalation.
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3.1.1.2 Fee-for-service encourages over utilisation of pharmaceuticals
The cost of pharmaceuticals represents a big proportion of overall healthcare 
expenditure in LMICs (in some cases reached more 50%). During the past two 
decades, many interventions were implemented in various LMICs, including 
enforcement for implementing essential drug lists and increasing awareness 
among prescribers through rational drug use activities. However, the cost of 
pharmaceuticals continues to represent a high proportion of overall healthcare 
expenditure in many LMICs. Evidence from Taiwan showed that 94.3% of 
hospitals aggressively cut the costs of pharmaceuticals as a response to the shift 
from FFS to a case-based payment that was implemented by the National Health 
Insurance Programme in 1995 [18].
From the author’s experience, the pharmaceutical industry is also adding pres-
sures on doctors to prescribe new medicines with a higher and sometimes unjustifi-
able cost. Under the FFS environment, where there are no limits for reimbursing 
medicine prescriptions, this factor represents one of the major challenges for health 
insurance schemes to control the cost of pharmaceuticals.
The absence of Standard Treatment Guidelines (STGs) for use of pharmaceu-
ticals in many LMICs (except for few conditions such as malaria and tuberculosis) 
has worsened the situation and added more incentives for providers to irrationally 
supply expensive and more quantities of medicines. For example, according to the 
author, a doctor can prescribe cefixime capsules to treat typhoid fever instead of 
chloramphenicol capsules as first-line treatment. The former drug could be 10 times 
more expensive than the later, which significantly contributes to the overall cost of 
treating typhoid fever cases. The author considers the absence of STGs for pharma-
ceuticals as one of the major challenges for LMICs to control cost escalation under 
the current widely used FFS payment system.
Co-payment or cost-sharing may be considered as a way to minimise the effect 
of FFS on cost escalation. However, evidence from Korea revealed that co-payment 
alone is not sufficient to tackle the increased volume of health services induced 
by healthcare providers [5]. Therefore, additional measures might be required to 
control the rising cost of pharmaceuticals for LMICs.
3.1.2 Administrative cost of fee-for-service
The administrative cost for FFS payment is generally higher compared to other 
provider payment mechanisms since the insurer is required to process the auditing 
of detailed provider claims retrospectively based on smaller units [5]. From the 
author’s knowledge, the poor management information system (MIS) has a negative 
impact on the administrative efficiency to check the accuracy of data submitted 
by providers. However, FFS has an advantage that the system is easy to design and 
implement with minimal institutional capacity and training [1].
3.2 Moving away from fee-for-service
As seen up to now, the contribution of FFS in increasing the cost of health ser-
vices for LMICs was identified. This section will discuss the need for reform from 
FFS to other methods in order to promote cost containment.
Evidence from LMIC has shown a significant escalation of the cost associated 
with FFS payment. For example, in Taiwan, the annual per capita health expendi-
ture increased by 15.7% during the period 1980–1994 [19]; and 20% annual cost 
escalation was reported in Thailand during the period between 1988 and 1997 as 
result of FFS payment [20].
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Due to the unintended effects of FFS, many countries in Asia and Latin America 
have implemented different reforms to their provider payment systems. For exam-
ple, Korea and Taiwan implemented reforms from FFS to case-based and global 
budgeting mixed payment systems [6, 21]; in Argentina, there was significant 
reform where they moved from FFS to capitation payment [6]; and a report from 
World Bank suggested that China was advised to move away from FFS in order to 
control cost escalation in healthcare utilisation [22].
Based on the evidence explored from LMIC on FFS payment, many LMICs may 
need to consider moving away from FFS to improve efficiency and overcome the 
problem of cost escalation. The analysis for the alternative payment mechanisms in 
the next section will help to propose an appropriate reform for each specific context 
based on the best available evidence.
To summarise this section, the problem of cost escalation of health services 
for LMICs was demonstrated as partly attributed to the widely used FFS payment 
mechanism, as one of the main contributing factors. Then the FFS payment mecha-
nism was analysed, and its potential in promoting excessive use of health services, 
rising cost of pharmaceuticals, and its higher administrative cost, were discussed. 
Finally, the section concluded with the necessities for LMICs to move away from 
FFS towards a more appropriate method for reimbursement of healthcare providers 
in order to tackle cost escalation.
In the next section, capitation, case-based and global budget hospital pay-
ment mechanisms will be analysed and the appropriate options for LMICs will be 
identified.
4. Assessing the alternative provider payment mechanisms
Section 3 discussed the role of the FFS payment mechanism as a contributing fac-
tor to cost escalation and suggested that healthcare systems in LMICs need to move 
away from FFS if cost escalation is to be controlled. This section will analyse three 
alternative payment mechanisms, capitation, case-based and global budget, and 
assess their potential to reduce the cost of health services for LMICs. The key issues 
analysed in this section are those illustrated in the conceptual framework (Section 2),  
particularly the incentives created by each payment mechanism and the relative 
administrative cost.
Unlike the retrospective FFS payment, capitation, case-based and global budget 
payments are prospective mechanisms. The term prospective refers to when the 
payment rate for a predefined package of health services for the fixed period of time 
is determined before the treatment takes place [10]. The units of payment are much 
more aggregated ranging from case treated, with case-based to the health facility, 
with a global budget [4].
4.1 Capitation payment mechanism
Capitation payment is defined as prospective, fixed payment to healthcare pro-
viders in order to care for a defined population for a defined period of time such as 
a year [11]. The key issue is that reimbursement for providers is not linked to inputs 
(such as diagnostic tests) or to the volume of service provided. Under capitation 
payment, providers bear more financial risk for the oversupply of services; there-
fore, they are more likely to use low inputs in healthcare to retain surplus and make 
profits [4, 23].
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4.1.1 Capitation payment incentives
According to Cashin [24], capitation payment can create incentives for providers 
for efficiency improvement, the attraction of additional enrollees, an investment in 
cost-effective health promotion and prevention interventions.
On the other hand, capitation payment can reduce the quality of care, encour-
ages providers not to enrol risky vulnerable patients and results in increased 
referrals to other providers [25–27]. Jegers et al. [26] suggested that this problem 
can be solved in the design of capitation payment rates by including risk adjus-
tors (such as age, gender, chronic illness and socio-economic status of enrolled 
patients). The aim of this risk adjustment is to compensate providers for the 
higher predicted cost for the care of more costly groups of enrollees such as 
elderly patients.
Evidence from Thailand has revealed that the introduction of capitation pay-
ment in 1990 turned the main contracted providers into risk bearers. They, there-
fore, became financially responsible for the cost of healthcare for each enrolled 
patient [28]. This has created incentives to increase the risk pool by expanding 
population coverage through more enrolment and pass the risk to other subcon-
tracted providers [28].
In the following subsections, three aspects affecting the cost of health 
services based on the conceptual framework discussed in Section 2 will be 
analysed. This will focus on incentives to improve efficiency, reducing volume 
and intensity of supplied service and promoting investment in prevention of 
diseases.
4.1.1.1 Capitation incentives to improve providers’ efficiency
Capitation payment creates strong incentives to promote efficiency in the use 
of resources [4]. Since providers bear more financial risk for services they provide 
under capitation payment, they are more likely to control cost by selecting rational 
and cost-effective services [5]. This is because when providers achieve efficiency 
gains and spend less than the per capita allocated budget, the difference between 
revenue and expenditure is maximised, and this surplus is retained by the provider 
as profit. On the other hand, if a provider runs out of budget, there is no additional 
payment under the capitation system [24].
Efficiency under a well-designed capitation payment system is promoted by the 
autonomy and flexibility in the use of resources [1]. This is because the available 
resources are closely linked to the number of population to be served as well as the 
health needs of each population [10]. This formula does not only encourage cost 
minimisation but also improves equity in the distribution of healthcare resources 
according to the health status of a population [1]. This directs providers to put more 
emphasis on primary and outpatient care rather than specialised and inpatient 
services [25].
The degree of incentives created by capitation payment depends on many 
issues including the health insurance benefit package, the regulations and medi-
cal practices existing in the system to prevent risk selection and the healthcare 
market structure [5]. For example, the availability of other competing providers 
in the same field encourages efficiency and patient satisfaction. Fortunately, 
the current health market structure in many LMICs can encourage competition 
because of the availability of enough numbers of healthcare facilities to ensure 
competition.
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4.1.1.2 Capitation incentives to reduce the volume and intensity of supplied services
Capitation payment can effectively achieve the cost reduction goal by creating 
incentives for providers to control inpatient admissions and the average length of 
stay, and review the medical necessity for providing each service [29].
In addition, providers may sacrifice the quality of health services in order to con-
tain costs [10]. Although quality is not the focus of this study, there is a continuous 
fight between reducing cost and improving quality of health services. Policy makers 
in LMICs need to make the necessary measures to ensure good quality of care under 
the expected reform in the provider payment system.
In Thailand, capitation payment was introduced in 1990 with the primary 
goal to contain the cost of healthcare [10]. As expected, evidence from Thailand 
has shown that providers responded to capitation incentives by greatly shifting 
to ambulatory outpatient care and reduced the inpatient services [6, 10]. To 
cope with this reform, providers undertook certain measures to reduce their 
cost for managing patients; for example, some hospitals dropped payment for 
doctor consultations by 30% for Social Security patients compared to regular 
patients [20].
4.1.1.3 Capitation incentives to invest in health promotion and disease prevention
When capitation payments are contracted for long-term periods with additional 
bonuses as incentives, providers invest in improving the health status of popula-
tions through more cost-effective health services like promotion and prevention 
interventions [5, 24, 29]. In Nicaragua, for example, capitation payment introduced 
in 1994 resulted in the adoption of a mixture of services with more emphasis on 
prevention and primary care than specialised high-level care [25]. This ultimately 
resulted in a reduction in the overall bill of healthcare for the Social Security 
Institute in Nicaragua [25].
4.1.2 Administrative cost of capitation payment
This is significantly lower than that of FFS because there are no claims to be 
processed on the insurer side [5]. Instead, the insurer is only required to audit the 
number of enrollees per provider to make the payment. However, a well-function-
ing referral system is required to ensure the cost-effectiveness of treatment at the 
selected level of care [10].
Administrative costs for managing capitation payment may increase if the health 
insurance decides to intervene in minimising risk selection by adding risk adjustors 
such as gender, age or chronic illness of enrolled patients [5, 24]. In such situations, 
the insurer incurs a more administrative cost for monitoring and tracking patients’ 
enrolment for each provider. Although this can be a negative effect that increases 
cost, it promotes equity in healthcare and contributes to the overall aim of social 
health insurance schemes in LMICs.
4.2 Case-based payment mechanism
Case-based is a prospective reimbursement mechanism in which hospitals are 
paid for each discharged inpatient case, based on a previously defined rate for each 
group of cases with similar clinical conditions and resource requirement [30]. The 
International Classification of Diseases (ICD) developed by WHO is widely used to 
define these groups for the purpose of setting payment rates [1].
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4.2.1 Case-based payment incentives
Case-based payment mechanism provides significant incentives for cost reduc-
tion [5, 31, 32]. The output-based design of this method has generated major 
incentives for providers to contain cost per case by minimising the use of resources 
utilised per case [5], for example, reducing the unnecessary utilisation of diagnostic 
and imaging services.
Unlike FFS, case-based payment has the potential to create incentives for pro-
moting hospital efficiency and control the cost of healthcare [1, 24, 33]. However, 
it also encourages contracted hospitals to unnecessarily increase admissions and 
readmissions, reduce the intensity and quality of care, avoid severe cases and shift 
patients for outpatient and community care for follow-up [24, 33].
Based on the conceptual framework, the following three subsections will analyse 
the relevant incentives that contribute to the cost of healthcare under case-based 
reimbursement.
4.2.1.1 Case-based payment promotes hospital efficiency
Hospital efficiency under cased-based payment is promoted through minimis-
ing the inputs used for case management and reducing the average length of stay as 
intended effects [24, 31, 33]. This is because hospitals are paid a fixed rate for each 
case regardless of the volume and intensity of service provided.
Case-based payment has been effectively used in many LMICs as a tool to 
control cost escalation during the past four decades. Stronger incentives to promote 
efficiency by controlling resources used per case were observed in Korea, Taiwan, 
Indonesia, China and Kyrgyz Republic [1, 18, 34]. For example, in Korea, the 
introduction of case-based payment in 1997 resulted in a 30% reduction in the use 
of antibiotics for inpatient care [21].
In Latin America, case-based payment has also been in existence for the past 
30 years, including in Argentina, Brazil and Chile [10]. In Brazil, for example, a 
mixed case-based and FFS payment system was introduced for reimbursement of 
both public and private healthcare providers [6]. Although this reform has created 
incentives for efficiency, evidence has shown that the low reimbursement rates 
have resulted in negative effects including the deterioration in quality of care and 
reduced utilisation rates [6, 10].
4.2.1.2 Case-based incentives to increase admission rates
A common problem with case-based payment is that it creates incentives for 
hospitals to increase admission and readmission rates [33]. However, one of the 
major advantages associated with case-based payment is the reduction in the aver-
age length of stay [24, 35], and it may create incentives for improving quality of care 
if payment rates are linked to the complexity of cases [10]. For example, the pay-
ment rate for complicated normal deliveries is higher than non-complicated ones.
In the Korean reform, the average length of stay has dropped by 3% on average 
as a response to case-based implementation [21]. The outcome of implemented 
case-based payment in Kazakhstan during the period 1988–2001 has resulted in a 
stabilised number of hospital admission rate, a decline in inappropriate admissions, 
and the average length of stay has dropped by 2 days on average [24].
In Taiwan, evidence has shown that during the first half year after implementa-
tion of case-based reform, both the average length of stay and cost per caesarean 
section admissions dropped significantly [6]. This reform has been confronted with 
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resistance from providers in Taiwan, but the insurer has utilised historical claims 
data to fairly set the case rates in order to minimise resistance from providers [6, 19]. 
Consequently, the coping strategies used by hospitals for inpatient admissions in 
Taiwan as a response to the implementation of case-based payment generally resulted 
in significant positive outcomes towards cost control [18].
4.2.1.3 Case-based incentives to reduce the intensity of care
Case-based payment has other major disadvantages including incentives to 
reduce the intensity of healthcare by prematurely discharging admitted patients, 
up-coding to higher classes in the payment schedule and shifting patterns of care 
and costs to non-case-based classes where mixed payment systems are used [1, 5]. 
The behaviour of premature discharge shifts the cost of healthcare from the hos-
pital to the outpatient services and community outreach care, which contributes 
to increasing the social cost for healthcare. It could also result in high readmission 
rates [36].
Evidence has shown that up-coding to a higher point practised by providers was 
not random, but it was systematically favoured by providers and mainly driven by 
their interest to obtain larger reimbursements [5]; and if the insurer has not taken 
appropriate measures to reduce this behaviour, the cost of healthcare will increase.
However, Kwon [31] suggested that if the level of care is too high due to the 
oversupply of services, then the reduction in the intensity of care as a result of 
implementing case-based payment does not affect patient outcome negatively. 
Evidence from the Taiwanese experience also supports this point, where irrational 
use of antibiotics for inpatients was reduced by 30% to cope with case-based 
payment [18].
4.2.2 Administrative cost of case-based payment
The administrative cost of the case-based payment system primarily depends on 
the complexity of design for case grouping. The cost of administrating very com-
plex case-based payment is very high for both providers to code cases, and for the 
insurer to monitor and process provider claims [5]. However, this cost can be lower 
than FFS in simply designed systems such as those used in Indonesia in the 1990s 
[5]. In Korea, the relatively high requirement for clinical and managerial informa-
tion for case classification has been evident [31].
To avoid the higher administrative cost, less complex case-based systems can be 
designed based on broader categories of case grouping [1]. This approach has also 
been proposed by Kwon [31], to adopt an incremental implementation of the new 
case-based system starting with a simpler classification of diseases.
4.3 Global budget hospital payment mechanism
Global budget payment is defined as an aggregate cash sum, fixed in advance, 
intended to cover the total cost of a service provided, and it is usually set for 
1 year ahead [37]. While the unit of payment in capitation payment is per 
enrollee, in the global budget, the facility is used as a unit of payment based on 
previous historical spending, the volume of service and hospital bed size, which 
are brought together in a resource allocation formula [1, 38]. Global budget pro-
vides a greater degree of hospital autonomy and increases transparency through 
the ease of auditing and accountability for allocated budgets and contributes to 
macro-economic efficiency [38].
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Based on the middle purple column of the conceptual framework (Section 2), 
the following subsections will focus on the analysis of incentives created by global 
budget payment and the relative administrative cost to run the system.
4.3.1 Global budget payment incentives
Global budget has a positive effect on controlling health insurance cost by 
creating incentives for hospitals to reduce the volume of services provided and 
encourages efficient resource utilisation [5]. Depending on the resource allocation 
formula, global budgeting has both positive and negative effects on the admission 
rate and the average length of stay in hospital [14].
4.3.1.1 Global budget incentive to reduce the volume of services
With global budget, the volume of healthcare provided is minimised by 
hospitals due to the shared financial risk [39]. In the short term, the volume of 
healthcare and use of input resources are minimised and, therefore, can pro-
mote hospital efficiency [1, 5]. However, in the long-term period, the degree of 
incentives brought by this mechanism depends mainly on the resource alloca-
tion formula [5] and budget adjustor such as age, sex, morbidity and utilisation 
rates from previous years [10]. In this regard, policymakers of the health insurer 
need to keep their attention while using historical data for allocating resources 
to hospitals, because there are greater chances of repeating existing patterns of 
resource use. For example, if a non-efficient hospital is receiving global budget 
based on previous data, without consideration to other adjustors, inefficiency will 
continuously persist.
Based on the logic discussed above, if other resource allocation adjustors and 
performance measures are not considered, global budgeting will reward inefficient 
hospitals (higher spending now to ensure higher budget next year) [38].
4.3.1.2 Effect of global budget on admission rate and the average length of stay
The admission rates are also reduced under global budgeting since contracted 
hospitals bear some financial risk [4, 5]. When performance measures are 
introduced in the resource allocation, incentives among hospitals may change as 
a response to the chosen indicators [38]. For example, in Hungary, the average 
length of stay increased because global budgets were allocated based on occu-
pancy rates [5].
The major disadvantages of global budget payment are that it is not reflective of 
the actual activities carried out by the hospital, but rather it is based on the hospital 
bed capacity [38]. Unfortunately, complicated cases are also treated with the same 
level of funding, which may lead to the referral of severe cases [10, 38]. This can be 
minimised by introducing more complex resource allocation formula to reflect the 
severity of cases [10].
4.3.2 Administrative cost of global budget
The administrative cost of the global budget is generally lower compared to 
other payment methods [5]. This cost is mainly brought by the resource allocation 
formula and there are no bills to prepare and no claim audits [1]. But, this cost may 
increase when using more complex resource allocation formulas such as risk-
adjusted or utilisation projection components in the formula [5, 38].
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The administrative cost is also possible to increase by introducing better moni-
toring of performance measures such as result-based assessment and evaluation for 
hospitals contracted under a global budget [38, 40].
4.4 Which payment mechanism is the best for LMICs?
Policy makers in LMICs need to understand that all provider payment 
mechanisms have advantages and disadvantages and there is no perfect method. 
Langenbrunner [41] stated that “the whole point of provider payment systems is 
to change behaviour”: that is, to change the way healthcare providers operate in 
response to different incentives discussed in this study under each method while 
achieving the policy objective of cost containment.
Mixed payment systems are widely used in different countries in Asia and 
Latin America: for example, (FFS, case-based and capitation) in Kyrgyzstan and 
Argentina, and (FFS and case-based) in Chile and Brazil [10]. The mixed system 
is adopted for practical reasons to counter the adverse incentives of using pure 
payment mechanisms [5]. For example, hospitals can be reimbursed on case-based, 
while primary care centres can be paid on a capitation basis. Mixed systems can 
even be used for one provider. This has been successful in Thailand where hospitals 
are reimbursed on a global budget to cover fixed costs and partly on case-based to 
cover variable costs for emergency cases [42].
According to Wouters [10], three main issues need to be considered when pre-
paring for a payment system reform: (i) the potential of the payment mechanism to 
control cost; (ii) the supporting system requirement for implementing the new pay-
ment system and (iii) the expected effect on quality of care. Since quality of care is 
out of the scope of this review, only the first two elements (i and ii) are summarised 
in the following two subsections.
4.4.1 The potential of alternative payment mechanisms to control cost
Based on the analysis for provider payment mechanisms, the discussion above 
summarised the findings of key incentives and administrative costs for the three 
alternative payment mechanisms. The summary of findings from the analysis of the 
existing FFS payment is presented for comparison purposes (Table 1).
As you can see in Table 1, each of the alternative payment mechanisms cre-
ates both positive and negative incentives and all of them are technically feasible 
to reduce healthcare costs. However, case-based has higher administrative cost 
compared to capitation and global budget. In terms of organisational feasibility, the 
case-based method also requires a higher institutional capacity to run the system. 
Therefore, capitation and global budget may be the most viable options for LMICs.
4.4.2 Supporting system requirements for implementation
The success of provider payment mechanisms cannot be achieved as stand-alone 
interventions; other supporting measures are equally important including legal, 
financial, referral, quality assurance and MIS [10]. For example, capitation pay-
ment requires a very well-developed referral system to operate effectively, while 
case-based payment relies on a well-designed and functioning information system 
to ensure accurate coding and keeping clinical records for each case managed. 
Figure 2 illustrates the relative level of complexity for supporting system require-
ments for implementing provider payment mechanisms.
To summarise this section, the three alternative provider payment mecha-
nisms were analysed: capitation, case-based and global budget. The conceptual 
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framework was used in the analysis and assessed the positive and negative incen-
tives created by each payment mechanism. The relative administrative cost to run 
each of these mechanisms and their potential in controlling the cost of health 
services were also analysed. The relative requirements for supporting systems to 
run each of the alternative provider payment mechanisms were also identified and 
compared.
The next section will present the conclusions of this study and potential mea-
sures for provider payment reform in LMICs.
Figure 2. 
Supporting system requirements. Source: adapted from [10].
Payment 
mechanism
Incentives Administrative 
cost
Capitation + Improves provider efficiency
+ Reduces volume and intensity of service
+ Invests in health promotion and disease prevention
− Selection of healthier enrollees
Low
Case-based + Improves hospital efficiency
+ Reduces the volume of inputs
− Increases admission and readmission rates
− Reduces the intensity of care
High
Global budget − Reduces the volume of supplied services
±  Increases or decreases admission rate and averages length of 
stay depending on resource allocation formula and performance 
measures
− May reward inefficient hospitals
Low
Fee-for-
service
− Does not promote provider efficiency
− Increases volume of supplied service
− Overutilization of pharmaceuticals
+ Improves access to healthcare
High
Key: +, positive incentives; −negative incentives.
Table 1. 
Findings from analysis for provider payment mechanisms.
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5. Conclusions
5.1 General conclusions
This chapter discussed the problem of cost escalation for providing healthcare 
in LMICs and analysed the existing FFS payment method for reimbursement of 
healthcare providers as the main contributor to this problem.
FFS payment significantly contributes to cost escalation by creating incen-
tives for providers to unnecessarily increase the volume of supplied health 
services and irrationally increase the utilisation of pharmaceuticals. Moreover, 
the administrative cost of FFS is relatively high compared to capitation and 
global budget payment mechanisms. Evidence from LMIC in Asia and Latin 
America revealed a number of reforms during the past four decades where they 
moved away from FFS to prospective payment mechanisms to promote cost 
containment.
Fortunately, the analysis of findings from the assessment of the alternative 
provider payment mechanisms has demonstrated the potential of these methods in 
controlling cost and promoting efficiency. Capitation payment and global budget 
hospital payment mechanisms may be the two viable alternative options for imple-
mentation in LMICs.
Both capitation and global budget payment mechanisms create strong incentives 
for providers to reduce the volume of supplied health services and their administra-
tive cost is low compared to the existing FFS payment method. Capitation payment 
has the potential to promote provider efficiency, while global budgeting may 
negatively reward inefficient hospitals if risk adjustors (such as gender and age) are 
not applied in the resource allocation formula.
Interestingly, capitation payment encourages healthcare providers to invest in 
health promotion and disease prevention activities to improve the health status of 
enrolled populations, but it can also discriminate against enrolling risky vulnerable 
and costly groups and select healthier enrollees.
Mixed provider payment systems can be used to absorb the adverse effects of 
using a pure payment mechanism and also for practical reasons in implementation. 
The success of implementing capitation and global budget payment mechanisms 
in LMICs requires other supporting systems with different degrees of complexity. 
Therefore, LMICs need to invest in strengthening both the financial information 
system and MIS. In addition, the utilisation management and quality assurance 
systems need to be introduced in the contractual requirements where separate pay-
ers such as health insurance schemes exist.
5.2 Potential measures for provider payment reform in LMICs
Based on the existing evidence and analysis provided in this chapter, a set of 
technically feasible potential measures is proposed for LMICs. The measures are 
summarised in two groups: short-term and long-term measures with a discussion 
of the feasibility (organisational, financial and cultural) for implementing each of 
these measures in LMIC context.
5.2.1 Short-term measures
• Adopt a policy reform for gradually shifting away from FFS towards the 
implementation of capitation and global budget provider payment mechanisms 
for reimbursement of healthcare providers.
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• Fair setting of reimbursement rates in the new payment system is required to 
avoid resistance from healthcare providers that may arise as a response to the 
proposed reform.
• Design of a mixed provider payment system with the following directions:
 ○ Capitation payment for reimbursement to primary care facilities.
 ○ Global budget payment for smaller and district hospitals.
 ○ FFS payment may remain as a method for reimbursement to outpatient 
departments and specialised healthcare, where appropriate.
• Make the necessary measures to keep the quality of healthcare at an acceptable 
level under the newly designed provider payment system as part of reform 
packages.
• Design and implementation of payment system reform are lengthy 
and detailed processes and need a legal framework for implementation 
(legislation).
• Recruit technical support from World Bank, WHO or other specialised institu-
tions for designing the new provider payment system, which should include 
setting the payment rates, resource allocation formula, billing system and 
improving the institutional capacity to run the new system. Technical support can 
be obtained through multilateral or bilateral development of cooperation projects.
• Strengthen the supporting systems to the relative degree of requirements to 
run the new provider payment system. These include the financial informa-
tion system, MIS, integrated referral system and utilisation management and 
quality assurance system.
• A large amount of financial investment, as well as training for human 
resources to administer the new system, is required.
5.2.2 Long-term measures
• Evaluate the newly introduced provider payment system to assess its effective-
ness in controlling the cost of health services and make periodical adjustments 
for payment rates based on data generated from the previous experience. 
A well-functioning MIS and reasonable financial budget are required to 
conduct this evaluation.
• Expand capitation payment for reimbursement of health services provided at 
the primary care level. All supporting systems are required to be functioning to 
a higher degree of complexity.
• Expand global budget payment for reimbursement of contracted hospitals. 
A well-functioning MIS is required to apply risk adjustors (such as age and 
sex) in the resource allocation formula. Financial and human resources need 
to be mobilised for monitoring and evaluation of performance measures for 
participating hospitals.
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